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IN THE SUP HEME COU ~ 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN TBE MATTER OF T :BE ESTATE ) REPLY TO PETITION 
OF FRED W. HARPER, ) FOR REHEARING 
) No. 8049 
Deceased. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Judge 
STATEMENT 
Respondent in her Petition for Rehearing 
listed some eleven points in which she claimed 
that this court erred in its decision or January 
21, 1954. It should be noted that a~ost all of 
these p0ints were raised and fully considered by 
the court in ita opinion. It is a fundamental 
rule that a rehearing will no·t be granted unless 
something new and important is offered for the 
court's consideration, Ducheneau v. House 4 Utah 
-1-
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463 1 11 Pac. 619; Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292 
ll Pac. 512. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing 
"' 
is in effect a re-argument of the matter originally 
briefed and argued to the court. However, we 
shall refer to certain arguments raised by 
Respondent's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
The Washington Case cited by Respondent, 
McPherson v. McPherson, (Wash 1939) 93 P. 2d 
429, is not in point because there was an appeal 
pending. !hat the appeal abates upon death of 
ene ot the parties during an appeal is certainly 
not the majority rule. See 3G A. L. R. 1466, 
at page 1469, citing Missouri, California, Oregon, 
Kansas, and Maryland eases. In addition, the 
statute being construed by the· Washington Court 
in that case, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup) Sec. 988, 
cited on page 429 of the case, required the 
entry of a final judgment. The only ceurt 
that we _coula find that has a statute similar 
be our own in that the finality ef t:te decree 
Df divorce was deferred for six months and no 
~urther act was necessary was Kansas, Gen. Statutes 
~r Ka~~~~- 1949. 60-1514~ where it was held 
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that the proviaions of the divorce statute 
in accordance with which the aecree was renderea 
were intended. to prevent a marriage by either 
party 11\d.thin six mentbs after the decree anci 
that aa to that matter enl7 the decree waa not 
final, ever7 ether result was a complete disao~ 
lutionoef the marriage tellowing at enee, Durlan4 
v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 P. 274. 
~he argument that the action should. aba.Se 
as te property interests in addition to the 
marital status because the property award is 
incidental tc the divorce action has certainl7 
been given no weight by the above cited authori-
ties. Rea pendent' a argument that tbe court's 
atatutery power te dispose of proprt,- is a mere '1 
1no1deat to the court's &Uthority to dissolve 
the marri.se is without substance. Sec. 30-3-5, 
u. c. A.~ 1953, states: 
"When a d.eeree .91 divorce k~ade the court 
may make such orders in relation to the 
ohildren~ property and parties ••• as may be 
equitable •••• Such subsequent changes or 
new orders may be made bJ the court with 
respect to the disposal of the children or the 
distribution o£ iroperty as shall be reason-
able and proper. (Em.phas is ours) 
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Tbere ia no question but that the lower court 
had jurisdiction to make a propert7 award when 
the divorce decree was made because the marital 
atatus was then still extant; but it the existance 
of said status is a neeeasarJ incident, as Res-
pondent argues, where then did the lower court 
acquire jur-isdiction to make the order ot June 
19, 1950, purpGrting te set the decree asidef 
~bis argument would operate against Reapandent 
rather than in her favor. 
Respondent states on page 12 of her brief 
that the rule adapted b7 this eourt would 
make "serious inroads in the marketability ot 
title to real property and can only further 
contuse the fee to the expense and harrassment 
of owners ••• u Just how this would occur, the 
.... . 
Respondent did not boSDer to state. But the 
court's attention should be directed to how 
real property law would be confused by adop·ting 
the viewpoint of the Respondent. If death iluring 
the interlocutory period automatically set the 
property interests at large there would be no 
sales of property at all that came through an 
.. 4. 
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interlocutory decree, even after the interlocu-
tory period had run and the decree had become 
tinal. It .&.• sproperty were awarded to B, and the 
interlocutory decree became final, an intending 
purchasar rrOM B would have to ascertain with 
certainty that A had not died during the period, b 
because under Reapondent•s viewpoint, 'the aeatb 
would automaticallJ Yacate the decree and reve&~ 
the property interests A' heirs. Who, then, 
woyld purehase preperty that was acquired thraugh 
an interleeutor7 deeree! Also, the present case 
under consideration shows the ditt'icu.lty of this 
court adoptins the Bespondent•a viewpoint. It 
the death vacated the interloeutorr decree as 
it affected the property im.terests, how could said ~ 
vacation recreate the joint tenaey, one of the 
tenants being dead? 
We submit that the e£feot ot an interlocutory 
iecree conveying preperty isto give the recipient 
a present interest in that property, a risht of 
occupanc1, a right to the risbts andprofits, and 
this being the ease, an automatice vacation ef the 
decree could not recreate the situation as it 
exisi-- "' _.._ .... ,__ 
------ ----~;;::Jielt 
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time the decree was made, since the recipient 
would have dissipated some ot the property 
passing under the decree, particularly it 
the award were moneyl 
Nor can we be concerned with the Respondent's 
discussion of the tacts, on pages 10-12, ot her 
brief, wherein the divorce action proper was 
erroneously described as "Ex parte•. Whether 
"' 
the interlocutor,- award in this caae was based. 
upon suilt or need or both, the death durimg 
the interlocutory period did not a1. ter tbat ta•' 
in the least; both the built ana/or need 
~emainedo The effeQt of the Respenient•s view• 
point woul~ be te reward the guilty or to take 
propertJ from the needy. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the court's decision in this 
case was correct and rests upon sound. principle-s 
ot law regarding the dh'elution or property 
and therefore request that the Petition for Re-
hearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Chris T. Praggasti, 
Jehn E. Stone, 
Attorneys tor Appellant. 
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